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STATE TAXATION OF BANKRUPTCY LIQUIDATIONS:
FEDERALISM MISCONCEIVED*
ONCE viewed as immune property within the custody of the federal sover-
eign,' a bankrupt's estate is now generally subject to the same state and local
taxes as are the property and activities of an individual.2 Judicial recognition
that government services subsidized by state property taxes were ratably ex-
tended to property in the hands of the bankruptcy trustee engendered the initial
inroad on this immunity.3 Subsequent federal legislation relegates agents or
officers conducting businesses by authority of United States courts to the status
of private parties for purposes of taxation.4 However, some courts have denied
the imposition of state and local taxes on trustee-conducted liquidation sales.5
Holding the waiver statute inapplicable, they have asserted that allowing such
taxes might interfere with Congress's paramount authority over bankruptcy
by burdening the court process through which that authority is exercised.
6
*California State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 245 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 961 (1957).
1. In re Mason Tire & Rubber Co., 39 F.2d 462, 465 (N.D. Ohio 1930) ; 3 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY ff 62.14, at 1509 (14th ed. 1956). Interference with property held in custodia
legis was apparently viewed as a violation of a sovereign's supreme political authority.
See Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 263 (1836) (invalidating levy by federal marshal
on property which had been placed in custody of law by prior levy of state sheriff) ; cf. 2
CooLEY, TAXATION § 554 (4th ed. 1924).
2. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932) (state corporate franchise
tax) ; In re Sims, 118 Fed. 356 (W.D. Ga. 1902) (state property tax) ; In re Conhaim,
100 Fed. 268 (D. Wash. 1900) (state property tax) ; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 62.14, at
1509 (14th ed. 1956) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 555 (4th ed. 1924) ; see Goggin v. Byram,
172 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1949) (county property tax) ; 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1952), note 4 infra.
3. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904). This rationale is particularly appli-
cable to merchandising concerns with large inventory stocks requiring significant police
and fire protection.
4. "Any officers and agents conducting any business under authority of a United States
court shall be subject to all Federal, State, and local taxes applicable to such business to
the same extent as if it were conducted by an individual or corporation." 62 STAT. 927
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1952), amending 48 STAT. 993 (1934); see note 36 infra and
accompanying text; text at note 37 infra. The 1934 act was passed in response to a district
court ruling that a federal receiver operating a gasoline distributing business was not liable
for a state sales tax on motor fuel. See Howe v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 4 F. Supp.
162 (W.D. Mo. 1933) (common-law immunity of trustee not affected by generally worded
state taxing statute), rev'd sub nom. Kansas City v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.), cert.
dejzed, 293 U.S. 617 (1934). Congress intended the statute to preclude significant loss of
state revenue. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; S. REP. No. 1372, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
5. California State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1951) (state
sales tax) ; State Bd. of Equalization v. Boteler, 131 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1942) (same);
In re West Coast Cabinet Works, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (same).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See note 5 supra. Cf. Cleveland v. United States,
323 U.S. 329 (1945) (federal statute exempted property of United States Housing Au-
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Other courts, reasoning that taxes levied against the buyer at a liquidation sale
rather than the trustee are irrelevant to the court process, have upheld these
taxes without reliance on the statute.
7
A recent Ninth Circuit decision refused to test a state use tax by the identity
of the party who suffered either its legal incidence or ultimate effect. In Cali-
fornia State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, the state was enjoined from hold-
ing a trustee in bankruptcy liable for failure to collect the use tax due from a
purchaser at a liquidation sale." The California statute levied the tax upon the
purchaser and merely designated the seller a collection agent., Finding the
legal incidence of use or sales taxes irrelevant, the court concluded that they
are in fact paid by the buyer.10 Nevertheless, the waiver statute was held in-
applicable and the tax declared invalid as a burden on the liquidation process."
Presumably, this burden lay in the inconvenience which collection caused the
trustee.
12
thority from state, county and municipal taxation) ; Pittman v. HOLC, 308 U.S. 21 (1939)
(state mortgage tax inapplicable to a federal instrumentality) ; McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819) (absolute prohibition of taxation of one sovereign by an-
other). But see notes 45, 47 infra and accompanying text; text at notes 42-44 infra.
7. See In re Leavy, 85 F._d 25 (2d Cir. 1936) (municipal sales tax) ; Jenks v. State,
188 Wash. 472, 63 P.2d 369 (1.936) (state conveyance tax). One state court has viewed
the tax as imposed upon the sale, rather than upon either buyer or seller. See Bird & Jex
Co. v. Anderson Motor Co., 92 Utah 493, 69 P.2d 510 (1937).
8. 245 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 961 (1957). The trustee had con-
ducted the bankrupt's business for seven years and had paid state sales and use taxes dur-
ing that period. Id. at 47.
9. 2 CAL. Rav. & TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6005, 6015, 6201, 6203 (Deering Supp. 1957):
§ 6005: "'Person' includes . . . trustee, trustee in bankruptcy .... .
§ 6015: "'Retailer' includes:
"(a) Every seller who makes any retail sale or sales of tangible personal property ....
"(b) Every person engaged in the business of making sales for storage, use, or other
consumption ......
§ 6201: "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this
State of tangible personal property .... .
§ 6203: "Every retailer ... making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or
other consumption in this State... shall, at the time of making the sales, or, if the storage,
use, or other consumption of the tangible personal property is not then taxable hereunder,
at the time the storage, use, or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from
the purchaser...."
See Sutter Packing Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 139 Cal. App. 2d 889, 294 P.2d 1083
(1.956) (private liquidator subject to sales tax in California) ; Market St. Ry. v. California
State Bd. of Equalization, 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P.2d 20 (1955) (same).
10. 245 F.2d at 45. The court did not support this conclusion with either analysis or
authority.
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id. at 45. The court could not have condemned the tax because it precluded full
realization by the bankrupt's estate, since it assumed that the buyer at the liquidation sale
inevitably absorbed the tax. See note 11 szpra and accompanying text. Therefore, the
only conceivable burden imposed on the bankruptcy process was the state requirement that
the seller collect the tax.
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NOTES
Contrary to the conclusion in Goggin, a sales or use tax levied upon bank-
ruptcy liquidations is borne by the trustee as seller.13 Price is determined by
the interaction of supply and demand. 14 By adjusting supply, the seller in a
unique market can evoke a rise in price enabling him to shift some measure of
a tax burden to the buyer.' 5 The risks, real or assumed, associated with the
purchase of liquidation goods sufficiently distinguish such goods from their
counterparts on the ordinary market to make liquidation sales unique.' 6 Never-
theless, the trustee cannot mitigate the effect of a tax by manipulating supply;
he is under a duty to liquidate the entire bankrupt estate.1 7 And while judicial
rejection of a liquidation sale would obviously alter the quantity involved, court
confirmation, when required or sought, is geared to the price offered by the
buyer rather than the value to be received by the trustee.' 8 Accordingly, just
as the existence of a tax does not give rise to a price increase in the original
13. Designed to counteract avoidance of the sales tax, the California use tax is levied
against buyers who purchase as retailers not subject to a sales tax and subsequently retain
the goods as consumers. 2 CAL. RaV. & TAX CODE ANN. § 6203 (Deering Supp. 1957),
note 9 supra. Since the tax is occasioned by the transformation of a retail into a consumer
use, it is not imposed at the time of sale. However, in determining the price they are will-
ing to pay, retailers will most likely consider their subsequent duty to collect a tax, from
the consumer if they resell or from themselves if they become consumers. In the former
event, they will not be able to shift the sales tax burden. Resale will take place in the
ordinary, not a unique, market.
14. SAMUELSON, EcoNomics 367-78 (3d ed. 1955).
15. Cf. id. at 382-83.
16. Many personal rights of the bankrupt do not pass to the trustee with the property.
A buyer cannot inspect books or ledgers and may not know precisely what rights he has
purchased. MJAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 349 (1956). A purchaser may find his property
subject to liens, since the bankruptcy court might not exercise its power to sell free of
liens. See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 70.99, at 1598 (14th ed. 1942); MAcLACHLAN,
BANKxRuPcY 351 (1956). Sales are always uncertain, for the court may refuse to confirm.
Thus, the position of a purchaser is precarious, since the sale immediately binds him but
leaves the court with discretionary power to release the trustee from his contractual ob-
ligation. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 70.98, at 1562-63, 1575 (14th ed. 1942). Finally, in the
absence of specific warranties, the rule of caveat emptor applies. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
1 70.98, at 1588 (14th ed. 1942).
17. The assets of the bankrupt's estate may be sold in bulk or in lots. 4 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY ff 70.97, at 1556 (14th ed. 1942). But the total assets must be sold. See Bankruptcy
Act § 2a(7), 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1952). But cf.
MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 348 (1956), suggesting that in "the most unusual circum-
stances," the court "might conceivably" allow a distribution in kind.
To mitigate the effect of a sales tax, the seller must be able to reduce supply or to sell
his goods in a market where they will not be subject to a tax. Since the trustee must sell
all his goods and since the sales tax is uniform in application, neither course is available
to the trustee. Accordingly, he must absorb the tax. SAMUELSON, EcoNomics 391-92
(3d ed. '1955).
18. Bankruptcy Act § 70f, 30 STAT. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(f)
(1952), requires court confirmation to sell property for less than 75% of its appraised
value. See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 70.98, at 1562-63 (14th ed. 1942), observing that the
statute requires confirmation whenever practicable, and MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 348
(1956), stating that court considers the gross sales price in fixing appraisal value.
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transaction, it will not constitute ground for dishonoring the sale. Although
the trustee must thus absorb a sales or use tax, bankruptcy court process is not
necessarily burdened. The ultimate economic burden falls on the unsecured
creditors,' 9 who also bear the burden of collection if the trustee is an agent of
the bankrupt's estate; and they, unlike the court, have no claim to constitutional
immunity.
The Ninth Circuit's assumption that the trustee is primarily a representative
of the bankruptcy court rather than of the unsecured creditors is question-
able .2  The trustee is elected by the creditors, and only upon their failure to
nominate a party meeting the standards of the act can he be appointed by the
court.2 1 His salary is paid by the estate ;22 unlike referees and other court
officers, he is not entitled to federal retirement benefits.23 While bankruptcy
referees formerly were also compensated on a fee basis by the estate, 24 Con-
gress termed such a system objectionable when applied to public offices and
granted the referees a salary to be paid from the federal treasury.2 5 The com-
pensation of trustees was not changed ;26 Congress presumably did not consider
19. See Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1.), 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104
(a) (1) (1952) (administrative expenses paid from estate as first priority). Administrative
expenses are those incurred in preserving the estate and reducing it to liquid form for dis-
tribution to creditors. Taxes incurred in so doing are administrative expenses. See Mis-
souri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943) ; 3 COLLMER, BANKRUPTCY 11 64.106 (14th ed.
1956); MAcLAcELAN, BANKRUPTCY 146 (1956).
To the extent § 67c subordinates statutory liens and liens of distress for rent on per-
sonal property, the burden will also fall on "secured" creditors. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c,
30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11. U.S.C. § 107(c) (1952).
20. But see Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Pearson v. Higgins,
34 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV.
L. REv. 1141, 1145 (1942) ; Note, Bankruptcy Sale as a Judicial Sale Free From Taxation,
1 J. PuB. L. 504, 505 (1.952). The only reason advanced by these authorities is that the
trustee acts under the court's supervision. See also Bankruptcy Act § 72, 32 STAT. 800
(1903), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 112 (1952), entitled "Limitation of compensation of
officers of court," which includes trustees within its terms. The description "officers" is
probably here utilized merely to outline those persons whose compensation is subject to
court review and approval.
21. Bankruptcy Act § 44a, 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1952).
22. See Bankruptcy Act § 48c, 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 76(c)
(1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 76(c) (Supp. IV, 1957).
23. See Bankruptcy Act § 40d, 60 STAT. 328 (1946), 11 U.S.C. § 68(d) (1952) (ex-
tension of retirement benefits to referees) ; H.R. REP. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1945) ; S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946).
24. See 30 STAT. 556 (1898), as amended, 32 STAT. 799 (1903), as amended, 52 STAT.
859 (1938) ; 2 Cou .iE, BANKRUPTCY ff 40.01 (14th ed. 1956).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 40c(4), 60 STAT. 327 (1946), 11 U.S.C. § 68(c) (4) (1952);
H.R. REP. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945) ; S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1946). See also Bankruptcy Act § 62a(4), 60 STAT. 330 (1946), 11 U.S.C. § 102(a) (4)
(1952) (extension of the franking privilege to referees).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1275, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1956) ; see Bankruptcy 'Act § 48c,




them public officers. 27 Admittedly, the bankruptcy court exercises significant
controls over the trustee.28 But they do not essentially differ from those em-
ployed by equity courts over fiduciaries in general.
2 9
Even if the trustee is primarily an agent of the bankruptcy court, however,
his conduct of liquidation sales seems within the federal waiver.30 The taxes
encompassed by the waiver are those which would be applicable if a business
operated by a federal agent were instead managed by an individual.3 ' The
California use tax is regularly levied against such individually conducted liqui-
dations.32 Moreover, case law outside the Ninth Circuit has consistently char-
acterized liquidation as within the conduct of a business.33 Nevertheless, be-
cause liquidations embrace the sale of fixtures as well as inventory, Goggin
distinguished them from business operations and held the waiver inapplicable. 84
Admittedly, the language of the statute permits such an interpretation; for
operating and liquidating a business may be activities of different scope and
purpose. 33 But the present statute succeeds a similar provision which express-
27. Cf. Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134, 136 (8th Cir. 1943) (only those instrumen-
talities paid from federal treasury can be deemed agents of federal government).
28. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (7)
(1952) (court to supervise collection and liquidation of bankrupt's estate) ; id. § 47, 30
STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1952) (trustee collects and liquidates
property under court supervision, deposits money at designated depository, submits account-
ing, furnishes information and investigates claims); id. § 48c, 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 76(c) (1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 76(c) (Supp. IV, 1957)
(trustee's fee subject to court approval).
29. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 164 (2d ed. 1956) (trustee's duties determined by courts of
equity) ; 2 id. § 172 (duty of accounting) ; 2 id. § 173 (duty to furnish information) ; 2
id. § 176 (duty to use reasonable care to preserve the trust property) ; 2 id. § 177 (duty to
investigate and enforce claims) ; 2 id. § 180 (duty to deposit money in a safe depository).
Compare these duties with those of the bankruptcy trustee, note 28 supra.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1952), note 4 supra.
31. See ibid.
32. See note 9 supra.
33. See Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943) ; In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp.
402 (E.D. Wis. 1950) ; In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ill. 1939).
34. 245 F.2d at 48.
35. See California State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1951);
State Bd. of Equalization v. Boteler, 131 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1942) ; In re West Coast
Cabinet Works, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 636, 660 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; In re Owl Drug Co., 21 F.
Supp. 907 (D. Nev. 1937). But see Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134, 136 (8th Cir. 1943) :
"The phrase 'conduct any business' should not receive a narrow and restricted interpreta-
tion, but should be construed to include any activity or operation in connection with the
handling and management of the bankrupt estate."
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 39.52-2 (1956) specifically states: "Receivers, trustees in dissolu-
tion, trustees in bankruptcy, and assignees, operating the property or business of corpora-
tions, must make returns of income for such corporations. If a receiver has full custody of
and control over the business or property of a corporation, he shall be deemed to be
operating such business or property within the meaning of section 52, whether he is en-
gaged in carrying on the business for which the corporation was organized or only in
marshaling, selling, and disposing of its assets for purposes of liquidation." See 3 Commx,
1957]
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ly included liquidations,36 and the reviser's note indicates that the new law was
not intended to make substantial changes in the old.37 Consequently, the present
omission of liquidations can be ascribed to an attempt to recite in generic terms
the particulars of the prior law. Furthermore, to reconcile local interest in
raising revenue with the aim of freeing the federal government from substantial
local interference, Supreme Court decisions commencing with Graves v. New
York ex rel. O'Keefe 3s have, without exception, directed liberal construction
of federal waivers in favor of state taxing authorities.39 The federal waiver
applicable to the conduct of businesses under the authority of United States
courts is an unequivocal declaration of congressional policy.40 If its scope is
ambiguous, Graves dictates a construction which includes bankruptcy liquida-
tions.
41
Case law suggests that a sales or use tax should be upheld even in the absence
of an applicable federal waiver. The immunity of one sovereign from taxation
by another originated in the belief that the taxing power is necessarily destruc-
tive.4 2 This rationale has been repudiated, 43 and Graves indicates that only
BANKRUPTCY 1 62.14, at 1511 (14th ed. 1956) (this administrative interpretation has been
sanctioned by tacit re-enactment) ; Wurzel, supra note 20, at 1170-71.
In the Matter of F. P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Cal. 1956), a district
court case following the Ninth Circuit distinction between liquidating and conducting a
business, holds liquidation proceeds not subject to federal income tax. The decision appears
to have overlooked the treasury regulation.
36. See 48 STAT. 993 (1934) (amended by 62 STAT. 927 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 960
(1952)) : "That any receiver, liquidator, referee, trustee, or other officers or agents ap-
,pointed by any United States court who is authorized by said court to conduct any busi-
ness, or who does conduct any business, shall, from and after the enactment of this Act,
be subject to all State and local taxes applicable to such business the same as if such busi-
ness were conducted by an individual or corporation . . . ." (Emphasis added.) See also
notes 4, 10 supra; Missouri v. Gleick, supra note 35, at 136-37 (8th Cir. 1943) (holding that
the statute covers liquidation of a business) ; In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 606
(S.D. Ill. 1939) (same).
37. See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1952) ; MOORE, JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY
ff 0.03(44), at 297-98 (1949).
38. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
39. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943); Tradesmens
Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940); CoRwIN, THE CoNsTItl-
TION AND WHAT IT MEAxs TODAY 179 (11th ed. 1954).
40. See note 4 supra; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 62.14, at 1516-17 (14th ed. 1956);
Wurzel, supra note 20, at 1168.
41. 306 U.S. at 483-87.
42. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). "[T] he power to tax
involves the power to destroy; . . . the power to destroy may defeat and render useless
the power to create .... "
43. See cases cited note 45 infra. Australia and Canada, facing similar problems of
federalism, have narrowly restricted intergovernmental immunities. Compare D'Emden v.
Pedder, 1 Commw. L.R. 91 (Austr. 1904) (adopting the rigid reasoning of McCnlloch v.
Maryland and holding state receipt tax inapplicable to salary of federal officer although
interference, with constitutional power of Commonwealth slight), with West v. Commis-
sioner, 56 Commw. L.R. 657 (Austr. 1937) (state income tax on pension of federal officials
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taxes which can be so manipulated should be invalidated. 44 Absent discrimi-
natory application against sellers and buyers at liquidation sales, a sales or use
tax should not seriously impede the federal bankruptcy process. A general tax
which significantly interfered with the unsecured creditors' ultimate recovery
would disrupt the state's entire business community-a result local legislators
are unlikely to favor. Moreover, the Supreme Court has regularly upheld state
levies which imposed only insubstantial burdens on federal instrumentalities. 4
If the trustee suffers any burden, it does not exceed the duty of collection.4 6
A sales tax may be collected by merely allocating part of the purchase price to
the state at the time of the sale. And while collection of a use tax might be
more arduous, it too falls within the purview of Supreme Court decisions find-
ing burdens insubstantial.
47
valid). See Amalgamated Soc'y of Engineers v. Adelaide S.S. Co., 28 Commw. L.R. 129
(Austr. 1920) (abandoning blanket prohibition of D'Emden v. Pedder, supra). See also
Dixon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter-A Tribute From Australia, 67 YALE L.J. 179, 180 (1957).
Canada has long opposed implied intergovernmettal immunities. See Abbot v. City of
St. John, 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597 (1908) (validating provincial income tax on dominion offi-
cial's salary) ; Caron v. The King, [1924] A.C. 999 (converse; on appeal from Canadian
courts).
44. 306 U.S. at 480.
45. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) (state excise tax on
lessees of mineral rights of restricted Indian lands) ; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939) (state income tax on employees of HOLC) ; James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (state gross receipts tax on contractor building dams for
federal government) ; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288
U.S. 325 (1933) (state ad valorem tax on lessee of restricted Indian lands) ; Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (state gross receipts tax on copyright royalties);
National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1869) (state capital stock tax
on national bank) ; Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11. Cal. 2d 156,
78 P.2d 731 (1938) (state sales tax valid although paid by national bank) ; Bedford v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 104 Colo. 311, 91 P.2d 469 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 105 Colo. 373,
98 P.2d 1120, aff'd, 310 U.S. 41 (1940) (state service tax on national banks). For valid
federal taxes levied against state instrumentalities, see Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405
(1938) (federal income tax on employees of Port of New York Authority) ; Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (federal income tax on state engineers). For dis-
cussion of the doctrine of "insubstantial burden," see Wurzel, supra note 20, at 1167; Note,
Bankruptcy Sale as a Judicial Sale Free Front Taxation, 1 J. PuB. L. 504, 505 (1952). For
examples of taxes substantially burdening federal instrumentalities and therefore held in-
valid, see cases cited note 6 supra.
46. Ordinarily, the seller is not required to collect a use tax. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 212.06(1), (2) (d) (Supp. 1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3404a(4) (Supp. 1955).
Seven states join California in imposing this requirement. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 791
(Supp. 1955); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-6-35(2) (Supp. 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 2095(3) (1949) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 371 (1951); 3 NEv. REV. STAT. c. 372.195
(1956) ; R.I. GEN. LAws c. 1887, § 23 (1947) ; S.C. CODE § 65-1427 (Supp. 1955).
47. See West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717 (1948) (possibility that state
estate tax would force federal government to conduct litigation ruled insubstantial burden) ;
National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869) (insubstantial burden
one which would not seriously impair instrumentality's usefulness or capability to serve
the government).
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Rather than suggesting invalidity, considerations of federalism militate in
favor of allowing state sales and use taxation of bankruptcy liquidations. State
governments, apprehensive of driving residents and industry from their bor-
ders, are hesitant to tax activities already burdened by significant federal
levies.48 Thus deterred from raising revenue through income, estate and cor-
porate taxation, they have in increasing measure relied on sales, use and prop-
erty taxes.49 To the extent these means are unsuccessful, the states' ability to
assume the myriad responsibilities entrusted to them without resort to federal
aid and potential federal control is diminished. 0 Taxation of liquidation sales
can produce substantial revenue for the states. ' Since such levies need not
hamper federal activities, antiquated principles of sovereign immunity which
undermine congressional and Supreme Court policy should not be permitted
to make more complex the already difficult task of adjusting the roles of state
and national government.
48. Due, The Nature and Structure of Sales Taxation, 9 VAND. L. REv. 123, 131
(1956) ; see Pierce, The Place of Consumers' Excises in the Tax System, 8 LAw & Cox-
T=P. PROD. 430, 438 (1941) ; Rice & Estes, Sales and Use Taxes as Affected by Federal
Governmental Immunity, 9 VAND. L. REv. 204, 222 (1956).
49. Sales and use taxes are the chief source of revenue for most state governments.
Hellerstein, The Scope of the Sale Under Sale and Use Tax Acts, 11 TAX L. FEv. 261
(1956). See Due, Sales Taxes; Three Different Types Prevail in Local Taxation Today,
7 J. TAXATiON 194 (1957). Due, supra note 48; Pierce, supra note 48, at 437. See also
Peterson, The Los Angeles City Sales Tax Administration, 2 NAT'L TAx J. 232 (1949)
(in Los Angeles, where the Goggin, case originated, local revenue increased 670% the first
year a sales tax was introduced). Collected monthly, sales taxes diminish the need for
reserve funds and loans, normally required between property tax collections. Id. at 246.
In addition, they do not threaten the disincentive effects characteristic of progressive in-
come taxation. See KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 14, 140 (1955), discussed in Solo,
Accumulation, Work Incentive, and the Expenditure Tax, 9 NATL TAX J. 283 (1956).
50. See Hellerstein, supra note 49; Pierce, supra note 48, at 433-34; Rice & Estes,
supra note 48, at 222.
The postwar European economic recovery, to a great extent based on sales taxation,
reveals the potential of such levies. See Brabson, Analysis of Sales and Use Tax Exemp-
tions-With Comment as to More Uniform Applications, 9 VAND. L. REv. 294, 309 (1956).
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